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“When we approach an enemy, to kill him, we kill him not because he’s an evil person, 
but because we make use of the instrument of terror in order to create fear for others.”1 
Feliks Dzerzhinskii, 1920 
 
Recent scholarship on Soviet state violence has drawn attention to the distinction between violence 
as “terror” and violence as a “purge” of the body politic. The former refers to violence that is 
designed to communicate a message to a wider audience and ensure submission to state power. 
The purpose of the latter is not to terrify or educate the wider populace about political enemies, 
but is rather the “forcible removal of specific segments of the population and the isolation or 
elimination of these groups.”2 In particular, scholars have questioned the application of the term 
“Great Terror” to the violence of the late 1930s,3 and to the several violent police “mass 
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operations” of 1937-8 (NKVD Order 00447 directed against “former kulaks, criminals and other 
anti-Soviet elements,” and the “national operations” against suspect ethnic groups carried out at 
the same time) that account for the vast bulk of executions and arrests of that time. Those “mass 
operations” cannot be separated neatly from the general process of arrests of party members and 
workers, and they contributed to the creation of a state of fear for many.4 However, the purpose 
was to excise from Soviet society, as secretly as possible, certain population “contingents” 
perceived to be inherently harmful as war appeared imminent, and to create a purified, aesthetic 
socialist community.5 
       Twenty years earlier the political police, the Vecheka (or Cheka), had also been charged with 
implementing a campaign of mass violence, but this assumed a somewhat different form. The Red 
Terror of late 1918 was officially and widely proclaimed, and its purpose was indeed to terrify and 
to educate as well as to excise through execution or confinement to concentration camps harmful 
elements believed to be irreconcilable to the new Soviet order. Lists of persons executed were 
published in the main daily newspapers, along with forthright justifications for the Terror. In 
addition, the Vecheka decided that it was necessary to publish its own journal, both for its 
employees and for the public, and thus from late September six editions of the Vecheka Weekly 
(Ezhenedel’nik VChK) appeared. This short-lived publication was, as one historian has recently 
put it, an “extraordinary monument to the Terror,”6 providing a fascinating insight into the function 
of violence as a means of constituting the early Soviet state. It has not, however, attracted much 
                                                          
4
 On the social dimensions of Stalinist repressions, see Wendy Z. Goldman, Terror and Democracy in the Age of 
Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression (Cambridge, 2007). 
5
 Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique: The Logic of Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism,” in Landscaping 
the Human Garden. Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework, ed. Amir Weiner, 
(Stanford, CA, 2003), 20-22.  
6
 Scott B. Smith, Captives of Revolution. The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik Dictatorship, 1918-1923 
(Pittsburgh, PA, 2011), 86. 
3 
 
attention from scholars. Moreover, the significance of the state violence of the earliest years of 
Soviet power in the context of the violence of the inter-war period as a whole has not been 
adequately explored.7  
       This article examines some of the principal themes associated with the intellectual history of 
early Soviet state violence, focusing especially on the period of the Red Terror. It discusses the 
rhetorical strategies employed by the party and political police to legitimize and justify (and 
thereby enable) the violence of the Soviet state, up to the point of purifying such violence and 
rendering it sacred. In doing so it opens up discussion on the nature of the ideology of Leninism, 
and it considers the question whether Leninism might usefully be considered a “political religion.” 
The nature of this ideology, and the strongly moralistic, indeed “hypermoral” outlook of the 
Bolsheviks, were of crucial importance for the development and justification of Soviet state 
violence.8  
       Bolshevik ideology combined Enlightenment rationalism with secular messianism. It was 
fundamentally motivated by its vision of historical eschatology: the transformation of the working 
people from the “darkness” of capitalism to “salvation” from suffering and exploitation in a 
classless society. Its purpose, as Igal Halfin has put it, was “to abolish politics, and to open a new, 
conflict-free, transparent page in the story of human existence.”9 However, as several scholars 
have stressed in the last decade and more, the means utilized by the Soviet state should be situated 
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beyond ideology and within the framework of modern European state practices, especially during 
the First World War,10 and indeed early modern techniques of state-building regarding the 
extraction of resources from the peasantry.11 Besides, its ideology was not merely Marxist but was 
influenced by and drew from several intellectual strands, including its context of genesis in 
autocratic late imperial Russia. David Hoffmann has argued recently that it is more accurate to 
understand Soviet state violence as the result of practices of state violence already established and 
subsequently “ideologized,” rather than as originating from ideology.12 I understand this equation 
with a difference in emphasis, with ideology more centrally important and modern state practices 
harnessed to these ideological ends in the context of various economic and military/political 
crises,13 although my focus is on elite discourse. 
       In addition to the central focus on the relationship between violence and the Bolshevik 
conception of the sacred, this article explores other aspects of Bolshevik discourse around violence 
and repression during the Civil War years (1918-20), especially during the first year of Soviet 
power. The article’s focus is upon the “external,” publicly consumable language, but this language 
did not usually conceal a very different “internal” discourse.14 This was a time of ideological flux 
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as theory met practice and general visions met concrete realities, and the ruling party was by no 
means monolithic in outlook. Publicly-aired debates were frequent, often furious, demonstrating 
the difficulty of distinguishing clearly the nature of public and private Bolshevik political 
discourse. Perhaps none was more significant in 1918, after the signing of the peace treaty with 
Germany, than the debates that flared up during the Red Terror between supporters and opponents 
of Cheka methods. Ultimately, the role of the political police and the instrument of “terror” as 
distinct from “revolutionary justice” were safeguarded by Lenin and the party leadership. 
However, discussions within the Soviet Justice Commissariat regarding criminological theory and 
penal practice offer some alternative and no less intriguing insights into the Soviet approach to 
repression. Taken together, these issues would be of fundamental importance for the development 
of the Soviet state for the next twenty years and beyond.  
The Red Terror: “Reading all about it” 
       From the very outset of their revolution, the Bolsheviks faced armed opposition from their 
opponents of varying political hue, and by the summer of 1918 they were faced with full-scale 
frontal civil war and widespread peasant revolts. The repressive actions of the Bolshevik state 
intensified as a result, as did the rhetoric of terror.15 The assassination of Moisei Uritskii, the head 
of the Petrograd Cheka, and an attempt on Lenin’s life on the same day, August 30, led to the 
official declaration of Red Terror on September 5. Concentration camps were to be used to isolate 
class enemies, and all persons concerned in any way with “whiteguard organizations, conspiracies 
or uprisings” were to be shot. The victims of such measures were to be named in the press.16 The 
tone was set the day after the terrorist attacks, with the party’s central newspaper, Pravda, 
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announcing that “The class murderer, the bourgeoisie, must be crushed.”17 The decree establishing 
the Terror identified the Vecheka as the institution to which primary responsibility for conducting 
this campaign of violence would devolve. The decision to entrust the operation of the Terror to the 
Chekas’ three- and five-person boards rather than the specially-created courts for counter-
revolution, the Revolutionary Tribunals, signified, as Matthew Rendle has noted, the triumph of 
“revolutionary terror over revolutionary justice.”18 
       Scott Smith has described the Red Terror as having served, through its accompanying rhetoric 
and publicity, as “ideological performance.” That is, it provided “bodily form to the concept of the 
White Terror, entangled SRs and bourgeois as co-conspirators in it, and masked the true nature of 
resistance to Bolshevik power.”19 The Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs) were the Bolsheviks’ 
principal socialist rivals for power in Soviet Russia, and were implicated in the terrorist attacks of 
August 30. The purpose of the concept of White Terror, as Smith explains, was to link all 
opposition to the Bolsheviks to the same source - international capital - and thereby to publicly 
discredit the SRs. The opening article of the Vecheka Weekly stated as one of the journal’s aims to 
demonstrate to workers and poor peasants who their class-political enemies were, how cunning 
these enemies were, and to impress upon them the impossibility of a third option between 
proletarian and bourgeois dictatorships. In this way, the “treachery” of the Mensheviks and SRs 
would be exposed.20 The Bolsheviks were attempting to monopolize revolutionary discourse in 
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order to “make literal the trope of class war” and discredit the more moderate political orientations 
of the Mensheviks and SRs.21  
       In doing this, the Bolsheviks were acting with political cynicism, or “ideological 
dissimulation,” but also with genuine conviction regarding the objective alignment of forces in the 
international class struggle.22 The slogan of political absolutism, that there could be “no middle 
course” between the absolute power of the Bolsheviks and counter-revolutionary restoration in 
Russia, became an essential tenet of the Bolshevik mind-set during the Civil War.23 Revolution - 
as Lenin had been insisting since 1905 - was war,24 and the Civil War context reinforced this 
conviction. For the Bolshevik leadership, there appeared to be no essential difference between the 
repressive reality for the masses in autocratic tsarist Russia and the democracies of Britain and 
America. In those democracies, the “horrible oppression of capital” kept the workers in “slave 
chains,” with outright violence against the people once they voiced their demands.25 Bolshevik 
reasoning here was that “violence” was the reality of any state system, whether the more subtle, 
“ideological” type practiced by democracies in peacetime to keep the masses in oppression, or the 
open, bloody violence of civil war.26 In this way, the party provided an important source of 
legitimacy for its methods of rule: its detractors were hypocrites, or at best misguided, and the 
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methods of the Bolsheviks were really no worse than those of any other state, but of course in the 
service of a just cause. 
       In fact, however, Bolsheviks repeatedly maintained that their hands were cleaner than those 
of their enemies. Violence is cruel, but this was something that, in general, Bolsheviks were not 
comfortable with. Those involved in establishing the new Soviet justice system took pride in the 
perceived distance between the “cruelties” of bourgeois states and Soviet power, which they 
viewed as “alien” to such cruelties.27 Similarly Martin Latsis, a leading Chekist described by 
Alexander Rabinowitch as particularly “fanatical,”28 wrote that, though the Soviet state was forced 
to resort to “drastic measures” (krutyie meryi), communists were far from the cruelties of their 
opponents.29 Indeed, the Vecheka Weekly was ordered to close down by the party Central 
Committee at the end of October following the publication of an article written by the Cheka in 
Nolinsk (Viatka province) that advocated the use of torture. The Central Committee reasoned that 
the article was “harmful and contradictory to the interests of the struggle for communism,”30 
presumably because it challenged the public representation of the virtuous Soviet fighter. 
       Unlike the mass police operations of the late 1930s mentioned above, the leaders of party and 
police during the Civil War felt the need for what Scott Smith calls a “participating audience.” 
Their “openness” regarding the violent and dictatorial nature of their rule was in part reflective of 
a moral righteousness that allowed and emboldened them, indeed required them, to speak candidly, 
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as it would to speak publicly in criticism of their own regime (see below). The target audience of 
such “public transcripts” was the Bolsheviks themselves - and mainly the Chekists in the case of 
the Vecheka Weekly - in addition to the wider public. James Scott has explained the importance of 
public discourse for the dominant group itself as target audience, as a means to “convince 
themselves anew of their high moral purpose.”31 Such discourse also tested the power of language 
to construct, rather than merely reflect, political realities,32 something that would become more 
significant in the context of Soviet politics by the end of the 1920s. 
       For Smith, the “participating audience” was, in the main, the workers. In reality, however, 
Bolshevik leaders struggled to communicate their message to an already small reading public, and 
even lower-level party members, that often did not understand the political terminology of 
Bolshevik newspapers.33 For the Vecheka leadership, there was an added imperative to reach 
beyond the barrier between rulers and ruled. The methods of the Chekas often provoked 
comparisons with the infamous equivalent of the tsarist state, the so-called Okhrana.34 The Weekly 
therefore published a section, “From the archives of the Tsarist Okhranka,” to highlight the 
differences between the two police forces. Whereas the Okhranniki were considered to have been 
motivated by careerist and monetary purposes, the defenders of the worker-peasant government 
were supposedly possessed of justness and “force” (i.e. the force of the people). The journal 
declared that “Every worker should take a more or less active part in the suppression of counter-
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revolutionary force, should consider themselves more or less active employees/collaborators of 
the extraordinary commissions [Chekas].”35 The Chekas were supposed to be more than just the 
repressive “iron fist” of the proletarian dictatorship. 
       The published lists of those executed were also intended to break down the barrier between 
the observers and participants of this violence.36 These lists (by no means comprehensive), along 
with brief descriptions of their identities and sometimes of their alleged crimes, were published in 
major newspapers and in the Weekly under the heading “Red terror.” Such lists also included 
hostages. The practice of hostage-taking was widely advocated by Lenin and applied during the 
Civil War as a brutally pragmatic measure to quell peasant rebellions or enforce state orders,37 and 
it points further to the differences between the “terror” of the Civil War and the excisionary 
violence of the 1930s. Judging by the lists, it appears that the majority were shot for allegedly 
agitating against Soviet power.38 Estimates of the total number of executed victims of the Terror 
vary. Il’ia Rat’kovskii puts the figure at 8,000 for the period August 30 until the end of the year; 
Nicolas Werth estimates between 10-15,000.39 The majority of the Terror’s targets were former 
tsarist officers and representatives of the tsarist regime.40  
       There was some confusion both within the party and within the Vecheka as to whether the 
purpose of the Terror was to target the bourgeoisie as a class, or simply the most dangerous 
opponents of the state. The party leadership, including Lenin, clarified that it would be 
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impermissible to practice physical violence against the bourgeoisie as a class.41 However, within 
the Chekas there was a greater tendency to conceptualize violence in such terms. In Voronezh 
province, Chekists resolved in mid-September that they would rather “destroy the whole bourgeois 
class than give it victory.”42 In 1919, a newspaper of the Ukrainian Cheka asserted that “If the 
establishment of the proletarian dictatorship throughout the world requires us to destroy all 
servants of tsarism and capitalism, then we will not halt before this but fulfill it with honour.”43 
Latsis published an infamous article in early November, in the journal of the Cheka in Kazan, that 
explained as the “essence” of the Red Terror that a suspect’s class should seal his/her fate, thereby 
earning himself Lenin’s censure.44        
       Lenin’s displeasure with Latsis was not an isolated incident; during the course of the Red 
Terror, the Vecheka was subjected to considerable criticism in the pages of Pravda and Izvestiia. 
Grigorii Zaks, a leading figure in the Vecheka, acknowledged in the Weekly that provincial and 
especially district Chekas often contained “unworthy” and even “criminal” elements in their 
ranks.45 This is not to suggest that there were not many Chekists in the provinces who truly 
believed in the revolution, although their understanding of party ideology might have been rather 
crude and simplistic.46 The Vecheka, however, was possessed of an institutional arrogance that 
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pervaded its dealings with other state agencies; Chekists realized that the survival of the revolution 
depended on them, in addition to the Red Army. For example, in late April 1918 Feliks 
Dzerzhinskii, the head of the Vecheka, wrote to the investigative commission of the Petrograd 
Revolutionary Tribunal in relation to the cases of two Chekists who had been arrested for 
wrongdoing following the shootings of six students. The Chekists may have been guilty of 
mistakes, Dzerzhinskii acknowledged, but if the investigative commission were to be guided by 
this spirit of “abstract humanitarianism,” then it should “bring to court our whole proletarian 
revolution.”47 
       Shortly after the commencement of the Terror, leading party figures such as Nikolai Bukharin, 
Lev Kamenev, Karl Radek, and David Riazanov began to voice criticisms of the scale of Cheka 
operations and their expansion to affect members of the working class. Soon, however, the 
discussion focused on the position of the “extraordinary commissions” within the Soviet system.48 
In Soviet Russia in late 1918 and beyond we have a scenario whereby, as Donald Raleigh puts it, 
there was at times “broad disagreement on fundamental issues” within the ruling party.49  Crucial 
questions of the new political order – its legal, constitutional, and institutional bases, the rule of 
law relative to the role of violence - were openly debated and contested, sometimes with 
considerable vituperation.  
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       To critics within the party, the Chekas had become too powerful, unrestrained and arbitrary.50 
Grigorii Petrovskii, the Commissar of Internal Affairs (NKVD), wrote in Izvestiia in late 
September that without restraint, the Chekas would introduce “depravity” to Soviet power.51 The 
issues at stake were not merely institutional rivalries but, as Lennard Gerson observes, “opposing 
tendencies within the revolution.”52 One such set of opposing tendencies concerned the 
constitutional nature of the new state. The Soviet Constitution of July 1918 stated that all power 
in Soviet Russia “belongs to all the working population of the country, united in urban and rural 
soviets.”53 The Vecheka, however, insisted that it retained ultimate authority over the Chekas, 
above the control of the executive committees of local soviets. Writing in Izvestiia on October 20, 
Viktor Tikhomirnov of the NKVD remarked at the fact that in many areas local Chekas were more 
powerful than local soviets. Tikhomirnov’s criticism was about administrative authority; he made 
it clear that he recognized the “extraordinarily important and necessary” work of provincial 
Chekas, and he suggested that the NKVD would not object to allowing Chekas autonomy from 
local soviets in “individual cases” when necessary.54 By contrast other figures, such as Mikhail 
Ol’minskii, who sat on the editorial board of Pravda, and Nikolai Osinskii, the head of the 
Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh), addressed the violence of the Chekas 
directly.  
       Ol’minskii reasoned that the “energetic and firm measures” of the Chekas were not always 
expedient, that leading Chekists were mistaken if they thought that it was merely ‘soft [spineless]’ 
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comrades who were critical of the institution, and he responded to the Chekist dismissal of 
criticism as “idle phrases” by insisting that these issues should be discussed publicly.55 Osinskii, 
writing earlier in the Terror, felt it necessary to remind Pravda readers that even though terror was 
necessary, the “destruction of the bourgeoisie as a class” should not mean “the physical 
extermination of all the bourgeoisie.”56 Osinskii demonstrated clearly that some leading 
Bolsheviks were opposed to the extent of Chekist violence aside from considerations of public 
relations, or administrative and constitutional transgressions. Indeed more broadly, as Michael 
Melancon has demonstrated, although “mass class-based arrests, executions, and hostage-taking 
were part of Sovnarkom’s [Council of People’s Commissars] Red Terror program,” these policies 
“repulsed” many Soviet activists and party members due to the “unnecessary violence that 
alienated much of the population.”57 In fact, several provincial soviets opposed the Terror outright; 
the executive committee in Pskov, for example, reasoned that “no absolutist state has managed to 
preserve itself in power by this bloody means.”58 Iakov Peters, one of the Vecheka leaders and the 
principle defender of his institution during these public confrontations, gave an interview to 
Izvestiia in late September in which he accepted that the Terror had often assumed “undesirable 
forms” in the provinces, and that the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class could not be 
accomplished through extermination.59 However, the “openness” with which the Chekists 
conducted the Terror through the Weekly co-existed with a refutation of the legitimacy of dissent 
on matters of fundamental importance to them, though they did engage in debate. Chekists were 
vituperative in confrontations with their critics, even though they acknowledged the inadequacies 
of local Chekas.  
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       On October 22 Izvestiia published a stinging response to Tikhomirnov’s article from the 
editorial board of the Weekly.60 The “constitutional” arguments of the Vecheka’s opponents were 
described as “philistine” and “petty-bourgeois” in nature. Local soviets were alleged to be 
composed, frequently, of “kulak” (exploitative rural) elements. The composition of such soviets 
allegedly contrasted with the leadership of the Chekas, who were described as mostly Bolsheviks 
of long standing.61 More basically, the article contended that the Soviet Constitution, which 
imagined a socialist state, could not truly be realized until the final destruction of counter-
revolution and the bourgeoisie.62  
       These debates exposed significant fault-lines within the party and between state institutions 
regarding the nature of the Soviet state, though Bolsheviks envisaged its eventual withering away. 
Chekists reasoned that it would be inappropriate, perhaps fatal for the revolution, to place the 
dictatorship under legal restrictions at a time of civil war. Were not the methods of struggle of the 
Chekas the highest revolutionary laws?, one contributor asked rhetorically in the Weekly.63 In 
addition, what is evident here is how Chekists replicated the terms of debate used by Bolshevik 
leaders against the non-Bolshevik socialists - the supposedly “philistine,” “petty-bourgeois” nature 
of their views, suggesting their illegitimacy - but applied these to Bolshevik critics.  
       On October 28, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets 
(VTsIK, the Soviet government) adopted a resolution that affirmed the rights of local soviets to 
appoint and dismiss local Chekists, and NKIu and NKVD to delegate representatives to the 
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Vecheka. It only stated, however, that decisions of Chekas could be overruled through the Cheka 
hierarchy (not by any other authority).64 On November 6 the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets declared that the “worker-peasant power” was “strengthened and 
consolidated,” and announced an amnesty for political prisoners (although certain types of 
prisoner, such as Tsarist gendarmes, were excluded from the amnesty).65 The official policy of 
Red Terror can be considered to have ended at this point, though the use of terror continued during 
the Civil War.66 The party was in agreement that reforms were required and that greater respect 
for the rule of law should be raised, and the Vecheka leadership consented. However, it was surely 
pleasant for Chekists to hear Lenin’s assessment, delivered at a Vecheka rally on November 7, that 
the attacks on the institution were “all narrow-minded and futile talk” that reminded him of “[Karl] 
Kautsky’s homily on the dictatorship, which is tantamount to supporting the bourgeoisie.”67 The 
Vecheka’s continued existence was assured for the rest of the Civil War, and the party’s Central 
Committee resolved in December that there should be no place for “malicious criticism” of the 
state’s organizations (namely the Vecheka) in the press.68 
Political Religion and Soviet State Violence 
       In order to understand more deeply how and why Bolsheviks justified their practices of 
violence, it is necessary to examine the nature of the ideology in question. Leninism may provide 
the most clear-cut example of what can be considered a “political religion” or “secular religion.” 
This is not to suggest that Leninism can be reduced to this concept, or that it is the essential key to 
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our understanding of the Soviet state.69 It does, however, serve as a very useful heuristic technique 
that allows us to make greater sense of Leninism as a political phenomenon.70 The historian of 
fascism Emilio Gentile, perhaps the leading advocate of the concept in recent years, identifies the 
characteristics of a political religion as, first and foremost, the teleological, eschatological 
orientation of an ideology that defines the meaning of life and “ultimate ends of human existence.” 
In addition, the existence of a “mythical” and “sacred” history connected with a “chosen people” 
that would serve as “the regenerating force of all mankind” points to the messianic dimension of 
political religions.71 Most pertinent to the present discussion, a feature associated with political 
religions is the sanctification of violence for the ends described.72  
       Political religion concerns the sacralisation of politics, and the concept rests upon the 
assumption that religion and the sacred are not confined to the realm of other-worldly 
transcendental divinity, or at least that political religions can exist as ersatz (substitute) religions, 
or religious substitutes. This is perhaps the principal problem with the concept. The historian of 
religions Stanley Stowers argues that the concept of political religion rests on a false assertion of 
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the nature of religion, and he questions why the sort of emotional-intellectual attributes of so-
called political religions should be considered religious, as opposed to merely political, in nature.73 
In response to this, I refer to Philippe Burrin’s important clarification that “It would be better to 
start with the metaphorical nature of the term ‘political religion’ and to recognize that the adjective 
is more important than the noun.”74 One additional problem is that applying this concept to 
Leninism might imply that Bolsheviks were “fanatics,” thereby undermining their rationality as 
political actors. In response to this, I refer to an important recent monograph on fanatical violence 
by Roger Griffin, another prominent proponent of political religions theory. Griffin defines 
fanaticism not in the pejorative sense commonly associated with the word but, rather, as “a state 
of total commitment which allows no self-doubt, is intolerant of pluralism, moderation, and 
‘deviant’ opinions…[whereby the fanatic is] capable of acts which transgress conventional civic 
or moral laws in the name of a higher principle.”75 Such an understanding of the term does appear 
applicable to committed Bolsheviks. 
       The sacred can be understood, as Mark Steinberg has put it, as a feeling for “images and stories 
that speak with a sense of awe and mystery of structures of meaning and power that reach […] 
toward transcendent mythic qualities.”76 The revolutionary period coincided with a revival of 
religious and spiritual sentiment in Russian society, and for many Russians of differing social 
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strata this era appeared to have apocalyptic significance.77 More generally, to restrict 
understanding of the religious to its more conventional institutional sense is to overlook or 
underestimate the significance of religious (or religious-like) and sacred motivations as factors in 
modern political violence.78  
              The notion of secular or political religion dates back certainly to Rousseau and the French 
Revolution. In his Political Theology, an examination of sovereignty and the relationship between 
jurisprudence and theology published in 1922, Carl Schmitt considered that “All significant 
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”79 Unsurprisingly, 
during the era of dictatorships in the 1930s and 1940s, scholars such as Eric Voegelin and Rayond 
Aron devoted attention to the concept of political religion.80 Much scholarly analysis of fascism 
and especially Soviet socialism during the Cold War, however, labored under the influence of a 
less sophisticated notion of “totalitarianism.” Yet it has long been recognized that the Bolsheviks, 
as adherents to an ideology with strong Salvationist/eschatological overtones, were certainly 
consonant with the Russian intellectual tradition. 
       For Nikolai Berdiaev, the Russian people were characterized by a religious way of thinking, 
and the messianism inherent in Marxism combined with the messianic “Russian Idea” to produce 
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Bolshevism.81 Elements of the Christian narrative could be co-opted syncretically to describe the 
similar conceptual trajectory and emotional appeal of Marxism-Leninism.82 In such cases the 
purpose was not simply rhetorical effect to communicate with a people steeped in Christian culture, 
but to suggest very sincerely that the true essence of the Christian ideas of Justice, Salvation, and 
deliverance from evil would be made manifest through the revolution. One newspaper in Ivanovo-
Voznesensk province in 1920 characterized communism as the true “religion of humanity.”83 This 
article referred to the importance of “belief” in the communist cause, rather than merely acceptance 
of the putative scientific truths of historical materialism. Similarly, a newspaper obituary for a 
Chekist in Saratov in 1919 celebrated the fact that the deceased had “piously, to fanaticism, 
believed in the triumphant outcome” of the proletariat’s struggle for freedom.84 It is questionable 
whether the explicit use of religious language and imagery would have been approved by 
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Moscow.85 Bolsheviks, after all, were militant atheists, and the state’s anti-religious publications 
stressed the falsity of any sort of religious belief.86 Before the revolution, Lenin had condemned 
the “God-builder” movement conceived by some Bolsheviks who sought to develop social-
democracy as a form of religion.87 Yet it is also true that the ruling party had an “ambivalent” 
relationship with the sacred, and leading Bolsheviks sometimes publicly replicated explicitly 
religious language.88 
       It is quite evident here that despite their atheism, it was crucially important for Bolsheviks to 
invoke the spiritual and emotional strength of some sense of transcendent purpose to individual 
life within secular historical time.89 It should not be surprising, then, that the Soviet institutions 
involved in direct armed struggles should celebrate their dead as martyrs, whose lives and deaths 
would be vindicated by the triumph of socialism. In an obituary in the Vecheka Weekly for a 
deceased young female Chekist, the editor wrote: “Awareness of such a bitter, difficult loss would 
be almost unbearable, if we did not know that we carry with us the great truth of Socialism, the 
great emancipation of all the exploited and deprived.” The “pure blood” of the deceased had been 
given, with love, for the future of the world’s workers.90 Indeed, the vision of the New Soviet 
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Person was not the warrior-figure of Nazi imagery.91 Fighters for the Soviet cause were called 
upon to steel their hearts when in battle,92 but the conventional understanding of the Bolshevik 
emotional sphere as one, essentially, of class-based enmity and “toughness” is inadequate.93 The 
ideal Soviet citizen was to possess a moral purity and highly-developed sense of love and 
compassion. One Bolshevik declared at a party conference in Novgorod province in late 1918 that 
the ideal person of the communist future – and to which standard communists should strive at the 
present time - would be “a bearer of absolute truth and justice. In his soul – complete harmony, 
love for life, himself included.”94 Mirroring the communitarian essence of the Russian religious 
concept of sobornost’, and the New Testament, the obituary for the fallen young Chekist remarked 
that “we do not know a greater love” than to give one’s life for the sake of the future of others. 
Not surprisingly, this theme had appeared in explicitly Christian form in Russian propaganda 
during the First World War.95 Berdiaev asserted that the communist type “completely in the grip 
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of the service of an idea and capable of enormous sacrifices” was possible “only as the result of 
the Christian training of the human spirit.”96 
       The revolution and the struggle against the “enemies of the people” that followed, then, served 
as the Bolsheviks’ redemptive, sacrificial passage from the old world to the new. René Girard has 
explained that sacrificial customs are concerned with “a radically new type of violence, truly 
decisive and self-contained, a form of violence that will put an end once and for all to violence 
itself.”97 This dialectical notion of violence to end violence is of cardinal importance for 
understanding how violence in the service of the revolution was not simply justified but sacralized 
in Bolshevik thought. One article of August 1918 in the newspaper of the Petrograd Soviet referred 
to the “redemptive sacrifices/victims” (iskupitel’nyie zhertvyi) demanded by “fate” – or history – 
for the “emancipation of humankind.”98 Writing in the Vecheka Weekly, one Chekist reasoned 
strikingly that “we have set about merciless struggle” against the bourgeoisie because “we value 
and love life too much – it is a sacred gift of nature.” What is evident here is the importance of the 
First World War as an imperialist war in the Bolshevik legitimation and justification of 
revolutionary violence. The bourgeoisie were slowly draining the “juices of life” from the 
proletariat and would engineer further wars in the future.99 In this regard, as Julie Fedor has 
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brilliantly argued, the Soviet concept of “active humanism” – the necessity of taking (violent) 
action to eradicate the sources of human suffering – was quite central to the representation of 
violence as morally good.100 
      In his excellent study of Soviet moral representations of violence through literature, Dariusz 
Tolczyk identifies two literary strategies that were utilized in the 1920s in order to justify violence. 
The first was based around the idea of tragedy. The historical necessity of violence requires actions 
that are themselves contrary to the actors’ ultimate opposition to violence in human affairs, and so 
creates a certain amount of ethical ambivalence. We have seen that there was a significant amount 
of such ambivalence, even disdain, towards violence amongst Bolsheviks at all levels. The other, 
and according to Tolczyk principal strategy utilized, was ethical iconoclasm: a reversal of the 
negative moral connotations of violence. Not only is there no ethical hang-over, but where 
necessary violence becomes ethically positive in the service of the revolution due to 
“unquestioning faith” in the revolution as “salvation.” Violence becomes “totally purified” in the 
process.101 It would be a mistake, however, to see these two strategies in as distinct a manner as 
Tolczyk seems to suggest.102 Even in the Vecheka Weekly, where violence was openly and 
unabashedly announced, bloodshed was not morally unproblematic. For example, G. Shklovskii 
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wrote of the French Revolution that “no-one can be gladdened by the spilling of blood, but with 
critical analysis of historical events it becomes clear to anyone that the French people were forced 
to resort to terrible means.”103  
       Sometimes elements of both strands identified by Tolczyk were evident in the same text. One 
article in the central Izvestiia noted that “Terror for us is not a system, but a terrible necessity of 
the present decisive moment of world history.” This was not, however, simply a case of the end 
justifying the means; the author made it clear that the sword was being wielded “in the name of 
the highest ideals of humanity,” that a virtue could be made of necessity.104 Indeed, Bolsheviks 
self-consciously inhabited a supreme ethical sphere, effectively “beyond good and evil” as 
understood in particular historical contexts.105 In the words of an article in Petrogradskaia Pravda 
(quoting Clara Zetkin), “Bolsheviks cannot avoid measures that are not measurable on an ethical-
historical scale.”106 Such lofty language was not merely “external,” for public consumption, but 
expressive of the convictions that had driven the party to power, and it was not merely the language 
of the party elite in the major cities. For example, the Cheka chairman of Bel’skii district in 
Smolensk province told a local congress in early 1919 that the struggle ahead was for “the future 
of humanity.”107 The purification of violence, its sacralization as a means to the ultimate end, was 
sometimes made very explicit. In Bolshevik discourse, the purification of violence usually required 
a removal of focus from the act of violence to its practitioners. Simply put, violence in the interest 
of the revolution could not be compared as like with imperialist or reactionary violence. The agents 
of counter-revolutionary violence were often described as having been, quite literally, “bought” 
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by international capital, or simply as defenders of their “monetary power.” Their “base” (podlyi) 
motives stood in contrast to the supposed purity, selflessness and humanity of the fighters for 
Soviet power, as well as the justness of their cause.108 To quote from an article of January 1919 in 
Petrogradskaia Pravda: “Violence, which the proletariat sets in motion, is sanctified 
(osviashchaetsia) in the eyes of the wide masses by that great goal which it serves!”109  
       In thus sanctifying their acts of violence, Bolsheviks were neither original nor unusual. In the 
context of modern Russian history they were clearly continuing - in power - the tradition of 
revolutionary terrorists in late imperial Russia to cloak themselves in innocence, as Susan 
Morrissey has explained, to purify their acts of violence relative to the “real” violence of the 
imperial state.110 Violence was also justified in both manifestations as an essential requirement for 
asserting and establishing its antithesis: nonviolence and human dignity.111 The sacrality of 
violence in both types was strongly connected to the construction of an ethos of martyrdom and 
sacrifice (as discussed above), in a paradoxical willingness to assert the sacredness of life by 
relinquishing one’s own and/or that of others. Scholars of revolutionary terrorism in late imperial 
Russia have observed the centrality of self-sacrifice to the representation of such acts as virtuous, 
and perhaps to alleviating the guilt associated with the act of violence.112 In Soviet Russia in 1918, 
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the requirement for Chekists to prepare themselves for self-sacrifice, in apparent mimesis of 
Christ’s ultimate salvific sacrifice, was clearly announced in the Vecheka Weekly: “The decisive 
hour is approaching: be prepared to die for the triumph of the world revolution.”113  
       This is not, however, to suggest that Bolshevik constructions of justification for violence after 
1917 simply grew out of this earlier Russian revolutionary ethos, not least because the type of 
violence (mass state violence versus individual terrorism) was very different, and because the First 
World War altered the context for the Bolshevik understanding of violence more generally. Indeed, 
in a broader transnational and contemporary context, the concepts of “holy war,” martyrdom and 
self-sacrifice, in the Christian tradition, were important components of propaganda aimed at 
soldiers and civilians during the First World War.114 Many religious figures during the war 
sacralized the conflict against national enemies as a form of redemptive purification for the nations 
involved.115 Yet while the crossovers between politics and religion may be commonplace in 
modern history – and especially at a time of war – “political religion” as a distinct analytical 
category remains valid to describe those movements such as Bolshevism that are usually referred 
to as “totalitarian.” That is, such movements are absolutist, preclude the circulation of contrary 
viewpoints, and espouse a single specific truth-claim regarding the teleological purpose of a people 
or humanity in general.116  
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       The distinction between political and non-political crime was not very clear-cut in Soviet 
Russia. Ultimately, all criminality was incompatible with the eschatological purpose of the regime. 
Leninism posited a belief in the effective perfectibility of humankind through development of a 
new type of person capable of living under communism. Belief in the attainability of an 
aesthetically pure, harmonious and unitary future society required the removal of imperfections 
and the active sculpting of society by the state. The practical demonstration of this came especially 
in the 1930s as the party and police sought to cope with criminality and social disorder through 
increasing excisionary violence directed against criminals and other “anti-soviet elements.” It is 
therefore important for the student of Soviet state violence to address the significance and 
development of Soviet criminology. In addition, it is important here to turn our attention briefly to 
the Justice Commissariat (NKIu) as the main institutional counter-weight to the political police in 
the Soviet state, in order to compare and contrast the respective approaches to repression of the 
two institutions.  
              Countering notions of a linear development from Leninist penal policy to the Stalinist 
GULAG, Peter Solomon notes that the Civil War period witnessed the development of “a 
progressive policy, which differed radically from that practiced by the Cheka and OGPU.”117 In 
fact, the legal scholars Piers Beirne and Alan Hunt have suggested that “Russian Bolshevism was 
in the vanguard of the neoclassical movement” in criminal justice in comparative European terms. 
The neoclassical approach to crime assumes a somewhat positivist understanding that places 
responsibility on social circumstances to some extent rather than just the agency of the criminal, 
as well as a belief in rehabilitation of the offender.118 M(iacheslav) Kozlovskii of NKIu, writing 
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in the first edition of the Commissariat’s journal in August 1918, outlined the orthodox Marxist 
position that crime in capitalist society is a product of the anarchy of production that leads to social 
instability. “Every crime,” he explained, “is a product of irreconcilable class antagonisms,” and 
not a person’s “free will.” The corollary was that, with the disappearance of economic inequality, 
crime would eventually disappear.119 
       If all crime, then, was determined principally by forces external to the criminal, how should 
the state and the law deal with a criminal who was not, ultimately, responsible? Kozlovskii’s article 
contained a fascinating discussion of the metaphysics of human nature. He disagreed with the 
assertion of the Austrian socialist lawyer Anton Menger that crime would continue to result from 
“human instincts” even under desirable social conditions. The implication of Kozlovskii’s 
argument was not, however, that strong punitive measures or even “terror” would be inappropriate 
under proletarian law. In the transitional period between capitalism and communism, he explained, 
an enormous legacy of crime had transferred. Soviet penal policy would abandon the principle of 
“retribution” and seek, rather, the “correction” of the criminal. However, though cruelty would not 
be part of Soviet penal policy, “punishment” could not be dispensed with. The sole purpose of 
punishment would be the defense of society from criminal “encroachment.” He reasoned that the 
state would need to act with “resolute surgical measures, measures of terror and isolation” for the 
defense of society.120 Thus, Kozlovskii had arrived at an argument that reconciled progressive 
jurisprudence with forms of state violence. 
       Soviet legal theorists were in fact unambiguous about the law as an instrument of class 
struggle. “We openly declare,” wrote Pëtr Stuchka, briefly Commissar of Justice and a leading 
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Soviet legal theorist, that until classes were abolished “our courts will be class courts.”121 Dmitrii 
Kurskii, Justice Commissar from August 1918, stated that Revolutionary Tribunals were not courts 
“in the true sense of the word” but, rather, “special organizations for struggle with counter-
revolution.”122 Conversely, leading Chekists such as Dzerzhinskii were not necessarily opposed to 
the “progressive” approach to reforming offenders, and considered concentration camps means of 
re-education as well as rational utilization of the labour of inmates.123 It would be wrong, then, to 
think that NKIu and the political police were at fundamentally contrary purposes. Bolsheviks 
understood both state and law as temporary institutions of the transitional stages to communism, 
and the law was supposed to be sufficiently “flexible” to accommodate revolutionary expediency. 
Laws should be observed and respected, Lenin emphasized, but it was clear in his mind that courts 
were also important instruments both of terror and of popular education.124 Indeed, with the 
introduction of NEP and curtailment of the political police, Lenin wrote to Kurskii in 1922: “An 
especially militant role now falls to the People’s Comissariat of Justice.”125  
       Nonetheless important differences existed between the Vecheka and NKIu, in terms of ideas 
and institutional practices. Chekists tended to adopt an approach quite different to that of Soviet 
legal theorists regarding the question of criminal agency, though naturally their focus was more 
on dangerous counter-revolutionaries than regular criminals. For example, an article in the 
Ukrainian Cheka newspaper Krasnyi mech (The Red Sword) advised those “amongst our 
comrades” who entertained the notion that the guilt of “predators” was alleviated somewhat by 
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their circumstances to stand aside and not impede others (Chekists) from implementing their 
“sacred responsibilities before the Revolution.”126 The Cheka in Morshansk (Tambov province) 
reasoned that there could be no “softness” shown to those who act “consciously” (soznatel’no) to 
strangle the people.127 Similarly, an article in the Weekly referred to former tsarist gendarmes, etc. 
as “corrupt souls” that should be struck from the face of the earth.128 This may be contrasted with 
Stuchka’s assertion that he could not “reproach” the bourgeois intelligentsia because they were as 
responsible for their ideological views as for “the colour of their hair.”129 
       The discussion of crime and counter-revolution through medicalized language was a 
significant feature of Bolshevik discourse and its justification of violence and repression. Indeed 
through this language, as indicated by the Kozlovskii article, the progressive (Justice) and 
repressive (Cheka) strands of thought could be reconciled somewhat. The Chekist Latsis wrote 
that “It is necessary to chop off [otsekat’] every unfit member of society so as not to lose the whole 
organism,”130 a logic of social prophylaxis that would be shared by Nazi doctors in Auschwitz.131 
The Cheka in Morshansk described the Red Terror as “anti-infectious inoculation.”132 Medicalized 
language served two broad purposes in Soviet punitive discussions. First, it provided rhetorical 
form for a progressive penal policy that sought the “healing” of offenders and their restoration to 
health and society. Second, it added justification to repressive measures - whether execution or 
incarceration - as life-affirming and healing/prophylactic for the wider body-politic. Medicalized 
language and, as Daniel Beer has demonstrated in his account of Russian criminology across the 
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revolutionary dividing point of 1917, the development of a conceptualization of deviance and 
crime through the co-optation of biomedical theories in Soviet ideology, “lent coherency and 
specificity to the Bolsheviks’ fears about the residual effects of capitalism on the mentality and 
morality of its citizens after 1917.”133 More broadly, biomedical discourse as a framework for 
understanding social issues may be considered a “central defining characteristic of modernity.”134  
       The healing purpose of Soviet penal policy - the “treatment of criminal elements” rather than 
their punishment in a retributive sense - was explained by L. Savrasov, head of the Punitive 
Department and NKIu Collegium member. Prison was to be a type of “social clinic” that would 
treat inmates differentially; Soviet legal theorists appreciated that social conditions could produce 
individuals with nasty inclinations.135 The task of re-education would involve both labour and 
“cultural-educational work” in the reformatories. Prisoners were to acquire a love of work, and 
this would allow them to join “the great family of the workers” as healthy, useful members.136 In 
reality, early prisoner release was common in the first years of Soviet power, especially as prisons 
were usually overcrowded. However, there arose in Soviet penal policy a tension between the 
reformatory impulse and the necessity of ensuring social defense from the “contagion” of 
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criminality and deviance, which may be understood in terms of a more general interaction between 
intentions and realities. With the adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the early 1920s, 
opinion in NKIu would more or less come to accept that a more differentiated approach to the 
criminal population was required, one that postulated that not all would be reformed. Nikolai 
Krylenko, then deputy Commissar of Justice, pointedly declared at a national penal congress in 
1923 that “in present circumstances” the principal purpose of criminal justice was the protection 
of society, not the protection or reform of individuals.137 By the middle of the 1920s, the use of 
extrajudicial police measures to remove “socially-dangerous elements” was common, and would 
intensify in the course of the following decade.138 
       From as early as 1918, in fact, the question arose as to whether or not the state would be able 
to reform certain categories of deviants and criminals.139 Chekists were more likely to consider the 
counter-revolutionaries that they encountered as incorrigible.140 However, in an article of October 
1918 in the NKIu journal, Savrasov directly posed the question whether it would always be 
possible to “correct” the criminal, and if there should not be, in certain cases, “punishment in the 
literal sense of the word?” What he had in mind was crimes of large-scale speculation, bribery, 
and serious abuse of office, all of which he considered political in nature.141 In reality, speculation 
– the crime category that Savrasov focused upon - was not dealt with particularly harshly through 
the courts during the Civil War.142 However, Savrasov’s comments about certain incorrigible 
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criminal types that should be isolated from society add a useful corrective to Paul Hagenloh’s 
important book on Stalinist policing. Hagenloh asserts that the dominant views around criminal 
elements as dangerous “contingents” (or a criminal class) that needed to be removed from society, 
which developed through the 1930s, originated from within the police system and not the legal or 
criminological profession.143 Basic elements of this view, albeit with regard to very particular 
types of criminal, existed within the upper echelons of NKIu as early as 1918.  
       Savrasov’s views on large-scale speculation and serious crimes of responsible office were 
close to those of leading Chekists, who pointed out that these crimes were linked with counter-
revolution and should be punished mercilessly, up to and including execution.144 Savrasov’s article 
was strongly criticized in the NKIu journal by Iakov Berman, a Bolshevik lawyer and later legal 
scholar, who thought that Savrasov’s views would result in the abandonment of a humane penal 
policy.145 Some months later, Savrasov accepted that his views were somewhat “heretical,” as in 
Soviet penal theory “there are no incorrigible criminals.” He explained, however, that there was 
simply neither enough time nor resources to reform all criminals; general prisons (as opposed to 
reformatories) or isolators, he reasoned, were really for those who were not inclined to reform, and 
hence should not be labeled “correction institutions.” He concluded that the Bolsheviks, 
responsible for burying the “rotting corpse” of bourgeois society, should not worry about salvaging 
all the “filth” of that society.146  
Conclusions 
       The fledgling Soviet order faced a life-and-death struggle for survival in the Civil War, and 
the radicalization of the state’s approach to violence during 1918 was very much in response to 
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the enormous economic and military difficulties faced, as well as the reality of “White” terror. 
Intense fears of invasion, and of counter-revolutionary penetration of the interior, remained with 
the Bolsheviks in the coming decades. However the utopian, religious-like nature of their 
ideological vision of a perfectly harmonious communist future drove them with terrible, tragic 
irony to establish the most violently destructive and repressive state order in peacetime Europe in 
the twentieth century. One can conclude, with reference to Terry Eagleton, that many of the 
Bolsheviks approached violence without “piety,”147 without recognising as their own the terrible 
destructive capacity that resides in human civilizations and especially modern civilization, but 
attributed this to the sphere of a capitalist order that they were intending to destroy.  
       The Bolsheviks, unlike the Nazis, conceived violence dialectically, as a means of overcoming 
itself that would lead to true peace and harmony in the world. This allowed them not only to justify 
their acts of violence but to retain the identity-distinction between themselves and those who were 
truly violent: the class enemy. The result was that violence in the service of the Bolsheviks’ 
ideological vision could be - and was - rendered pure and sacred. Violence was, largely though not 
always, openly and unashamedly proclaimed during the Civil War, reflecting its perceived 
legitimacy in a way similar to the open and fearless acts of revolutionary terrorism during the last 
years of the imperial autocracy.148 Yet there were limits to this process, as such explicit violent 
discourse could not last for long. The Bolsheviks, after all, had a complex ideological relationship 
with violence. On the one hand, leading figures such as Lenin and Trotskii were convinced that 
revolution could not be successful without it; on the other, they were in principle opposed to cruelty 
and indeed to violence itself as a feature of human relations, and Soviet criminal justice was 
premised on a highly progressive approach to criminal reform rather than repression. Indeed, as in 
the Russian revolutionary tradition more broadly, there existed a distinct “ethical duality” within 
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the Bolshevik discourse on violence, both a condemnation and embrace of it.149 Condemning the 
horrifying violence of the First World War, they insisted that the way to eradicate such brutality 
for humanity was through truly just, class warfare. By the 1930s, as Dariusz Tolczyk explains, the 
initial justification that violence was required as a temporary means to defeat the revolution’s 
enemies was beginning to wear thin,150 and especially once the triumph of socialist construction 
had been declared by 1934. The openness that accompanied much of the violence of the Civil War 
began to disappear, and the violent police “mass operations” of the late 1930s were supposed to 
be “absolutely secret.”  
       There were alternative currents in Bolshevik thought regarding violence and repression. In 
particular, Soviet legal theorists stressed the reform of deviants whereas Chekists were focused on 
repression, and the extent of the criticism levelled against the Cheka apparatus during the Red 
Terror clearly indicates significant divergent tendencies within the party and state apparatus. The 
debates within the party during the Terror also suggest, as Michael Melancon has argued, the 
existence of a deep-rooted, more democratic political culture amongst grassroots Bolshevik 
activists within the soviet apparatus, one that was contrary to the Leninist vision of one-party rule 
backed up by the terror of the Chekas – the vision that ultimately triumphed.151 Yet the 
“progressive” approach to penal reform was founded on the same utopian belief in the 
perfectibility of humankind and future society, the Salvationist impulse of Leninism, and the 
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